THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS JOURNALS

Ideology, Materialization, and Power Strategies
Author(s): Elizabeth DeMarrais, Luis Jaime Castillo and Timothy Earle
Source: *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 15-31
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2744153
Accessed: 22-12-2016 16:18 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Current Anthropology*

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 37, Number 1, February 1996
© 1996 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved 0011-3204/96/3701-0003$4.50

2
Ideology, Materialization, and Power Strategies[1]

by Elizabeth DeMarrais, Luis Jaime Castillo, and Timothy Earle

Ideology, as part of culture, is an integral component of human interactions and the power strategies that configure sociopolitical systems. We argue that ideology is materialized, or given concrete form, in order to be a part of the human culture that is broadly shared by members of a society. This process of materialization makes it possible to control, manipulate, and extend ideology beyond the local group. Ideology becomes an important source of social power when it can be given material form and controlled by a dominant group. We illustrate this process using three archaeological case studies: Neolithic and Bronze Age chiefdoms of Denmark, the Moche states of northern Peru, and the Inka empire of the Andes.

ELIZABETH DEMARRAIS is a doctoral candidate in the anthropology department of the University of California, Los Angeles (Los Angeles, Calif. 90095, U.S.A.). Born in 1964, she received her B.A. from Brown University in 1986 and her M.A. from UCLA in 1989. She is field director of an archaeological survey project in the Calchaquí Valley, Argentina, and has published "The Architecture and Organization of Xauxa Settlements," in *Empire and Domestic Economy*, edited by T. D'Altroy and C. Hastorf (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, in press).

1. The ideas presented in this paper have grown out of a lengthy discussion among the three authors. The cases that constitute the body of the article were written by Earle (Thy, Denmark), Castillo (Moche, Peru), and DeMarrais (Inka, Andes). The full text has been read and revised by us collaboratively. Funding for the research on which the cases are based includes the following: for Thy, Denmark, the National Science Foundation (DBS 9207082, DBS 9116921) and the Academic Senate, UCLA; for the San José de Moro Project, Peru, the John B. Heinz Charitable Trust, the UCLA Friends of Archaeology, and the UCLA Academic Senate; for the Proyecto Arqueológico Calchaquí, Argentina, the National Science Foundation (BNS-88-05471 and Dissertation Improvement Grant 9312006), the Fulbright Commission, the UCLA Friends of Archaeology, and the UCLA Latin American Center. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first biennial meeting of the Complex Society Group, October 23, 1993, at Arizona State University. We would like especially to thank Liz Brumfiel, Cathy Costin, George Cowgill, Terry D'Altroy, Deborah Erdman, Antonio Gilman, Susan Phillips, Kate Spielmann, and John Steinberg, as well as the anonymous referees, who read and commented thoughtfully on an earlier draft. We thank Patty Rechtman for her editorial assistance on the original draft.

LUIS JAIME CASTILLO is Associate Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. He was born in 1963 and received his B.A. from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (1987) and his M.A. (1991) from the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is a doctoral candidate. His publications include *Personajes míticos, escenas y narraciones en la iconografía mochica* (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la PUCP, 1989) and (with C. B. Donnan) "La ocupación moche en San José de Moro, Jequetepeque," in *Moche: Propuestas y perspectivas*, edited by S. Uceda and E. Mujica (Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Libertad, 1994), and "Las Mochicas del norte y las Mochicas del sur," in *Vicos* (Lima: Banco de Crédito del Perú, 1994).

TIMOTHY EARLE is Professor of Anthropology at Northwestern University. Born in 1946, he was educated at Harvard University (B.A., 1969) and the University of Michigan (Ph.D., 1973). His research interests are prehistoric economies, the evolution of complex societies, and political economies. He has published (with Jon Ericson) *Exchange Systems in Prehistory* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), (with Allen Johnson) *The Evolution of Human Societies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), and *Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

The present paper was submitted 25 IX 94 and accepted 3 II 95; the final version reached the Editor's office 17 IV 95.

Archaeologists representing both the processual and the postprocessual perspective have recently been examining ideology and its role in the development of complex societies (Cowgill 1993, Conrad and Demarest 1984, Demarest and Conrad 1992, Earle 1991*a*, Hodder 1982*b*, Miller and Tilley 1984, Renfrew and Zubrow 1994). The positions taken in these essays have been as diverse as the theoretical backgrounds of their authors, but their approaches to ideology generally can be characterized in several basic ways. For some ideology is epiphenomenal, determined by the organization of production within a society. Others view ideology and often its specific content as an active element that influences sociopolitical institutions and economic organization but find the explanation of this process problematic. Finally, for some ideology is the expression of the inner self, multiplying the potential number of ideologies infinitely.

We approach ideology differently, recognizing it as a central element of a cultural system. The direction we pursue here is to understand ideology as a source of social power. Social power is the capacity to control and manage the labor and activities of a group to gain access to the benefits of social action. Mann (1986) has identified four sources of power: economic, political, military, and ideological. Throughout history, rulers and chiefs have combined these sources of power in distinct ways to achieve specific goals. The choice of one strategy over another has profound implications for social evolution (Earle 1987, n.d.; Johnson and Earle 1987). Such choices reflect the historical circumstances and the objectives of groups (Brumfiel 1992) and differ markedly in cost, effectiveness, and sustainability.

In some instances, power depends heavily on coercion; Carneiro (1967, 1981) and Webster (1985) have identified circumstances under which military might is

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

an immediate means to extend political dominance. Effective in the short run, especially where control over the means of destruction is possible (Goody 1971), warfare is nevertheless a costly and unstable way of organizing power relationships. Others (Brumfiel and Earle 1987, Earle 1991*a*, Gilman 1981) have argued for the ultimate precedence of economic control, where land tenure systems and property rights permit direct control over production and exchange. However, economic control is problematic except in such circumstances as the development of irrigation systems, within which an agrarian population can be "caged" (Mann 1986), or in an insular setting in which control of the seaways provides similar opportunities for elites to limit access to goods and resources.

In still other cases, the strategic control of ideology contributes to the centralization and consolidation of political power. In this article, we evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of strategies that emphasize ideology and examine how ideology is linked to other sources of power. As archaeologists, we see a tremendous limitation in approaches that view ideology solely as ideas and beliefs that are rarely preserved in the archaeological record. We believe that ideology is as much the material means to communicate and manipulate ideas as it is the ideas themselves. Ideology has, therefore, both a material and a symbolic component. Because symbols are material objects, their distributions and associations, preserved in the archaeological record, reflect broader patterns of social, political, and economic activity. These patterns inform archaeologists about unequal access to symbols of status or authority, the efforts of one social segment to promote its ideology over others, and the effects of these strategic activities on the dynamics of social power.

Symbols, including icons, rituals, monuments, and written texts, all convey and transmit information and meaning to their viewers. These symbolic messages or meanings may prove difficult for archaeologists to reconstruct. Here we focus on ideology as a source of social power. What gives primacy to one ideology over another? How can an ideology supporting domination be sustained in the presence of an ideology of resistance? The answer, we argue, is grounded in the process by which these ideologies are given concrete, physical form. This process is the *materialization of ideology*. We argue that ideology is materialized in the form of ceremonies, symbolic objects, monuments, and writing systems to become an effective source of power. Materialized ideology can achieve the status of shared values and beliefs. Materialization makes it possible to extend an ideology beyond the local group and to communicate the power of a central authority to a broader population. We examine this process and, in three case studies, consider its effects on political power and institutions, the political economy, and the dynamics of organizational change. Given the scope of our discussion here, we will not address the ways in which our ideas apply to the study of less complex societies. In addition, although we are omitting a lengthy consideration of the relationships between ideologies of domination and resistance (Miller, Rowlands, and Tilley 1989; McGuire 1992), we view the process of materialization as an ongoing arena for competition, control of meaning, and the negotiation of power relationships.

Culture, Ideology, and Their Materialization

Materialization is the transformation of ideas, values, stories, myths, and the like, into a physical reality—a ceremonial event, a symbolic object, a monument, or a writing system.[2] If we think of culture as norms and values held in people's heads, it is difficult to understand how culture could be broadly shared at all. Human societies are inherently fragmented, representing many voices that reflect differences of age, sex, occupation, locality, class, and individuality (Keesing 1985). Each human being, influenced by experience, has an individualized reality. To exist outside of an individual's mind, culture is created in daily practice (Bourdieu 1977, Giddens 1984). Creating material representation is a central part of this process. Small groups, living closely together as in an extended family, might have the intimacy and communication to share, to some degree, a particular understanding of the world. Beyond the family group, however, values and norms are materialized to be shared more broadly. The forms of this materialization range from storytelling and other performances through the making of symbols and the construction of mounds and pyramids to writing in all its forms.

In speaking of materialization we emphasize the ongoing process of creation and do not assume the primacy of ideas. In fact, ideas and norms are encapsulated as much in their practice and in the conditions of daily life as in individuals' minds. To materialize culture is to participate in the active, ongoing process of creating and negotiating meaning. Because ideology is part of culture, materialization of ideology is a similar process, usually undertaken by dominant social segments. Its goal is to facilitate shared experiences of political culture such as those described by Kus (1989). Materialized ideology molds individual beliefs for collective social action. It organizes and gives meaning to the external world through the tangible, shared forms of ceremonies, symbols, monumental architecture, and writing. Materialization of ideology is at the same time a strategic process in which leaders allocate resources to strengthen and legitimate institutions of elite control. Thus the charac-

2. *Materialization* is distinct from the concept of *objectification* articulated by Marx (1844). For Marx, the objectification of labor was the worker's input of labor to create the material product. Under the capitalist system, this objectification of labor alienated the worker from the products of his or her labor (see also McGuire 1992:102–6). In choosing the term materialization we stress the evolutionary process through which the world is organized and given meaning by social action to create material objects oriented toward specific goals. In our view, this process has ongoing effects, both positive and negative, at all levels of social organization, affecting the members of a society in different ways at different times throughout a historical sequence.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ter of political power and ideology and their ties to the economy will be reflected by the specific means and forms of materialization employed.

While archaeologists may be ill-equipped to study specific thought processes without undertaking the daunting task of creating a "middle-range theory" of the mind (Cowgill 1993), we can examine how the materialization of ideology creates a shared political culture over time. We can study the investment itself (what was done with the available social capital) and its outcome (the ways in which the investment affected the stability and subsequent history of a society). Since the ideas and precepts of an ideology are made physical in order to be promulgated over a broad region and through time, the archaeologist comes into contact with the same materials created to mold the minds of peasants and subjugated populations. Different groups may promote competing ideologies through materialization, and over time the economic consequences of this activity, as well as varying success in institutionalizing the ideology and overcoming dissent, may enable one social segment to consolidate its position. Thus, viewing the materialization of ideology as an economic process makes it possible to see how social power derives from these strategic choices and how they may contribute to organizational change.

The materialization of ideology confers social power in two basic senses. First, an elite with the resources to extend its ideology through materialization promotes its objectives and legitimacy at the expense of competing groups who lack those resources. Because elements of materialized ideology have the characteristics of other manufactured goods while retaining their symbolic character, we can understand how control of the economy or of labor extends to control of ideology. The costs of hosting a feast, constructing a monument, or manufacturing paraphernalia and costumes for events ground ideology in the economy. An ideology rooted in a material medium can be controlled in much the same way that other utilitarian and wealth goods may be owned, restricted, and transferred through the institutions of political economy.

Second, materialization makes ideology a significant element of political strategy. Because ideas and meaning are difficult to control, it is impossible to prevent individuals who oppose the dominant group from generating their own ideas about the world and then attempting to convince others of their validity. The manipulation of meaning can be as much a means to resist as to legitimate authority (McGuire 1992, McGuire and Paynter 1991, Miller 1982, Miller, Rowlands, and Tilley 1989). However, an ideology composed solely of elements freely accessible to the populace has little efficacy as an instrument of power; it may easily be copied, and its capacity to restructure power relationships or to effect organizational change will therefore be limited. Materialization makes it possible, through the production and transmission of ideas, traditions, and meanings, to establish and reinforce the legitimacy and rights of the group that controls their material forms.

Means and Forms of Materialization

The means of materialization of ideology—ceremonial events, symbolic objects, public monuments, and writing systems—take innumerable forms (a speech, for example, is one form of ceremonial event). Broadly, these means and forms differ in terms of the audiences to which they can be directed and the ways in which they can be produced and manipulated. The selection of a particular means and form can therefore profoundly affect the ideology's effectiveness as a source of social power. Ceremonies, for example, integrate and define large groups. Many symbolic objects are transportable and can be given as rewards to individuals or viewed as emblems of social status or political office. Monumental architecture is a means of communicating on a grand scale; central places arise not only to house the activities of political life but also to serve as the symbolic focus of a polity. By examining the means and forms of materialization we can begin to reconstruct the strategies through which ideologies were generated. Because the impact of each of these means is distinct and because each requires particular raw materials, labor input, organization, and skills, the adoption of a particular means depends upon a leader's capabilities and resources. Similarly, the economic infrastructure will influence the resources that can be allocated to materialization. In more complex societies, a wider range of resources and labor can be devoted to this process, with the result that ideologies are materialized using diverse means and forms in order to accomplish the integration of a large and widespread populace.

CEREMONIAL EVENTS

Events create shared experiences for members of an audience through participation in rituals or feasts or attendance at speeches or performances. Because of their immediacy, rituals and events are especially powerful means for negotiating power relationships at all levels, from the status competitions of local chiefs to the enculturation of newly conquered populations within an empire. Although examples of unstructured ceremonial events exist, for most of them form, participation, and sequence are strictly prescribed (Geertz 1973, 1980). In many societies, ceremonies are repetitive, precisely timed to mark agricultural or ritual cycles. They may be organized around a mythical narrative that is reproduced and made real again during each performance. Among the farmers of the Funnel Beaker culture in Thy, Denmark, ceremonial events apparently emphasized corporate group identity through communal burial rituals that emphasized ancestral ties to the land. Because events are by nature transitory, shared experience and group solidarity begin to fade when they have ended (Leach 1954), and long-term effectiveness therefore depends upon repetition.

Many ceremonies involve the consumption of staple goods and the use of icons or other symbolic paraphernalia for their staging. Consequently, resources invested

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

in events generally are not capital investments. In contrast to monument construction and, in some cases, the manufacture of symbolic goods, events require continuing investment of resources. In ranked societies, competition for prestige and power often takes the form of feasting (Rosman and Rubel 1971). Chiefs may regularly host feasts to demonstrate their capacity to marshal quantities of food beyond the reach of others (Barnes 1988). Such ongoing hospitality may lead to dependency and encourage loyalty among those who come to rely upon it to help meet their daily subsistence needs (Barth 1965). At the state level, the costs of sponsoring a large-scale feast or ceremony surpass the resources of a single individual. The vast storage facilities of the Inka empire are testimony to the enormous cost to the state of underwriting its frequent feasts (D'Altroy and Earle 1985, LeVine 1992, Morris 1967).

State events may clearly demonstrate the asymmetry of power relationships. The ruling elite may designate sacred spaces or construct facilities for events in order to limit access to ceremonial spaces and the events taking place within them. Ritual events may be organizationally complex, supported by state institutions and specialist personnel who coordinate events sometimes including skilled performances that are spectacular or even life-threatening. Some elements of the state ideology may include vivid images of coercion, such as human sacrifice. Ritual paraphernalia is carefully manufactured to exact standards for use in the performance. These costs, complexities, and scale demonstrate through dramatic ephemeral images the hierarchical organization of the state and its apparent monopoly on such performances.

SYMBOLIC OBJECTS AND ICONS

Objects and icons, as materialized ideology, include the paraphernalia used in performances, ritual attire, mural paintings, and icons and emblems in any form. Portable objects facilitate symbolic communication among individuals, within social segments, and between polities (Hodder 1982*a*). As items of personal decoration they communicate information about gender, age, group membership, or social position (Wobst 1977). Icons of public display can communicate a standardized narrative message to many individuals simultaneously.

Symbolic objects are especially efficient for long-distance communication between elites or, more broadly, among political allies or social groups. In this context they signify relations of dependency, affiliation, or correspondence. Symbols exchanged or distributed within social segments or lineages create or reinforce vertical as well as horizontal relationships and help to generate loyalties and consensus among individuals (Brumfiel and Earle 1987, Friedman and Rowlands 1978). Ceremonial paraphernalia or status symbols are often paraded or displayed in ritual contexts, and because these objects can contain coded information they may also serve as mechanisms for narrative representations. Complex iconographic systems combine the immediacy of performance with the visual impact of often familiar objects and icons to communicate directly with a large audience. The use of these interdependent means of materialization strengthens the overall message and creates a vivid experience of the ideology.

Because symbolic objects can also be owned, inherited, and transferred, they are ideal signifiers of individual social position and political power. In burials, grave goods accomplish this function even beyond death. As materialized ideology, symbolic objects, like wealth goods, may be restricted in circulation and highly valued. However, these symbolic objects take a wide range of forms. Some, like wealth goods (D'Altroy and Earle 1985), are made of exotic or rare raw materials, prized for their commercial value as well as for their meaning. Many also carry direct messages about social position and identity (Wobst 1977). To maintain the value and exclusive associations of these objects, elites may limit access to the raw materials used in their production, to the technology of their manufacture, or to the skilled labor necessary for their creation.

Another source of value and meaning for symbolic objects may be their unique histories of ownership and exchange (Weiner 1992) or their direct association with an elite lineage or deity. These types of symbol may have high intrinsic worth based primarily on their ideological context, independent of their production costs. In these cases an object may be made of inexpensive materials (e.g., royal insignia) or have a unique context of production and use (e.g., ancient Olympic laurel wreaths). Similarly, skillfully crafted objects may have great value in a particular cultural context but in absolute terms cost little more than the food required by the artisans who produced them. In contrast to feasts and monument construction, some symbolic objects may effectively materialize social position at low production costs if their ownership or history can be carefully protected.

PUBLIC MONUMENTS AND LANDSCAPES

Public monuments and landscapes—mounds or pyramids, ceremonial facilities, large buildings and centers of political activity, or defensive structures—associate a group with a place and represent the power and authority of its leaders. Monuments can be impressive, even overwhelming constructions that are experienced simultaneously by a large audience. They are effective and enduring means of communication, often expressing relatively unambiguous messages of power (Kolb 1994, Trigger 1990). Large monuments may be visible to vast populations across broad geographic areas, making them ideal for indoctrination, population control, and the dissemination of propaganda. This elemental message often crosscuts differences in language, age, gender, or cultural affiliation.

Pyramids, large mounds, and rearrangements of the landscape such as artificial hills or barrows require enormous inputs of labor and materials (Abrams 1989), and their construction requires planning, management, and the organization of labor crews and raw materials. Mon-

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

umental construction may take place fairly rapidly, demonstrating a leader's capacity to marshal labor and resources. Less complex societies such as the Neolithic chiefdoms of southern England (Earle 1991*b*) and the preceramic societies of coastal Peru (Feldman 1987) have, however, created structures of impressive size, suggesting that some projects are "works in progress" built through the sustained input of labor over time. This labor may derive from regular taxation in the form of corvée, and therefore where there is a population to be taxed, monuments will increase in size or in number. Many Moche ceremonial centers were constructed in multiple discrete sections, each apparently contributed by a different population under elite control (Hastings and Moseley 1975).

Monuments and ordered landscapes domesticate unused territories and symbolize the appropriation of space (Kus 1982), organizing and materializing social relationships and boundaries. Monumental architecture also defines vertical relations within society. Within a settlement hierarchy, public spaces and ceremonial facilities generally appear first in regional centers (Flannery 1976), where they serve as the focus of power, representing the elite monopoly on civic-ceremonial activity. Thus the distribution of settlements and public architecture across a landscape serves as a map of a sociopolitical system. In Cuzco, the center of the Inka empire, a system of radiating lines, the *zeque* system, expressed and ordered the relationships between corporate groups, their productive lands, and the cosmos (Hyslop 1990; Zuidema 1964, 1983). Within a political elite, monuments may be subject to ownership, transference, and inheritance as long-term capital investments. In contrast to events, which are repeated regularly and can be adapted to changing circumstances, monuments are more permanent expressions of the ideology that links a group to its territory. Although the meanings expressed in a cultural landscape may change, monuments nevertheless strengthen the association of a group and a place. Long after a ruler has died or a polity has disintegrated, monuments such as Stonehenge or the pyramids in Egypt remain, evoking the history of a place, defying time, and giving ancient societies the aura of permanence and transcendence (P. Wilson 1988).

Monuments may also serve as facilities or settings for ritual events (Barrett 1994), often rituals that imbue portable objects with meaning. Thus, as constructed spaces, facilities are closely connected to other elements of the ongoing process of materialization. By exercising ownership of public facilities, elites can further restrict their use and closely monitor the staging of ceremonies through agents and institutions under their supervision. Both at Thy and in the Moche case ritual burials materialized elite control of landscape and ceremony (Bech and Olsen 1985, Donnan and Castillo 1992). They legitimated elite ownership of ceremonial spaces in life and, significantly, extended their influence beyond death. Thus ownership and elite privilege were sanctioned over generations, ascribed to individuals who could claim consanguinity with those interred.

WRITING SYSTEMS

Written documents, such as inscribed stelae or monuments, legal documents, contracts, and stories, are physical manifestations of belief systems and, like other means of materialized ideology, may tell a story, legitimate a claim, or transmit a message. While the other means of materialization accomplish this task indirectly through symbols, some texts are explicit and direct. Documents can formalize rules and relationships set out by those in power. In written religions, texts encode scriptures, prayers, and ritual traditions, standardizing these messages to allow their dissemination and adoption over a broad region (Goody 1986). Written documents and inscriptions may also communicate political messages or propaganda. In the Vijayanagara empire of India, for example, inscriptions on temples, public works, and slabs placed in villages recorded the generosity of elites (Morrison and Lycett 1994). Such inscriptions may be accurate, exaggerated, misleading, or even false. If overall literacy rates are low, inscriptions may represent esoteric knowledge held and manipulated by elites or religious personnel who are indispensable in positions of authority conferred on them by their literacy skills.

Writing and literacy afford opportunities for strategic control; beyond ideology, of course, the development of writing has had profound effects on human societies and their organization (Goody 1986). Writing requires education and training, so that control of specialists, including scribes and interpreters, can limit access to this form of materialization. In early literate societies, the technologies of writing, including engraving skills and ink and paper manufacture, could be manipulated by elites. Later, the invention of the printing press (Eisenstein 1979) would create opportunities for mass distribution of information both in support of and in opposition to the established political ideology. Now, through instant global communication, the image of a leader and debate over policy decisions are under constant public scrutiny, making it exceedingly difficult but also essential for leaders to control the images of government that reach the public (Thompson 1990).

Case Studies

We examine the materialization of ideology as a source of social power in three archaeological cases: Thy, Denmark, the Moche of Peru, and the Andean Inka. We have selected these cases pragmatically; we are conducting ongoing research in each case. Our firsthand knowledge informs us about the complexity and dynamism involved in relations of political power. In each situation leaders sought to establish and maintain political control over large populations. Although their methods, sources of power, and goals varied, the quest for power was common.

The cases represent an evolutionary spectrum from emergent chiefdom to massive empire. To some degree,

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

differences in scale, social complexity, and the institutional setting of power relationships account for the variation observed in materialization strategies. The Danish case illustrates the fragility of the simple chiefdom; ideology is weakly controlled by chiefs who sponsor small-scale ceremonies, exchange and possess simple symbols of position, and construct modest monuments. The Moche case demonstrates that the state is a more stable political formation in which the social order is played out through elaborate ceremonies, dramatic symbols, and complicated narratives that legitimate institutions of control that are re-created through ongoing practice. Finally, the Inka case suggests that expansionist empires may simplify ideology into critical elements that are "transportable" across cultural boundaries, among them representations of military power, state insignia, and massive ceremonialism.

We recognize that historical conditions of culture, institutional structure, and political economy create diverse social trajectories. We are concerned here with the materialization of ideology as a mechanism of political evolution and the way in which this process articulates with the broader social and economic processes that underlie the emergence of complex societies.

The Evolution of Chiefdoms: Thy

From the Early Neolithic into the Bronze Age, the prehistory of northern and western Europe witnessed cycles of chiefdom evolution and decline. Despite evident attempts to centralize and institutionalize power, emergent chiefdoms remained limited in scope and stability. Distinguished chiefs would emerge briefly in some regions only to lose power and be eclipsed by other regional developments (Bradley 1984, Kristiansen 1982). The Thy Archaeological Project (Bech 1993) seeks to understand the power strategies of these chiefs. In Thy, ownership of productive resources was limited as a source of power because the chiefdom's extensive agricultural lands had no developed facilities, such as irrigation systems or drainage projects, that could be controlled. Warfare also proved to be an unreliable source of power, because control over the technology of warfare was difficult to maintain. Ideology, considered here, was problematic until its materialization helped institutionalize a ranked system of warrior chiefs. Several different means of materialization were used, but control over the production of public symbols was ultimately the critical factor in the region's chiefly power strategies.

Located in the extreme northwest of Jutland, Thy is a low, narrow land bordered on the west by the North Sea and on the east by the Limfjord. The landscape is rolling terrain deriving from a terminal moraine, dotted with low hills and small streams, lakes, and bogs. Soils are fertile, but agricultural productivity is limited by northern winters and dry summers. Farming populations moved into Thy in the Early Neolithic and modified the existing forests by shifting cultivation. Beginning at about 2600 B.C., the forests were rapidly cleared; by 1500 B.C. the landscape was open grassland, presumably used for pasture (Andersen 1993). The development of a hierarchical ideology in this setting can be divided into three periods: Early Farmer (4000–2600 B.C.), Pastoral Warrior (2600–1800 B.C.), and Early Bronze Age Chiefdom (1800–1000 B.C.). Two key transformations are evident. The first was the cultural shift from the agricultural communities of the early farmers, in which group identity was emphasized, to the pastoral warrior society, in which attention was focused on the individual male warrior. Although economically and culturally distinctive, both these societies were small-scale and lacked strong regional chiefs. The second transformation was the emergence of regional chiefs who were buried with their special swords under earthen mounds that stood out prominently in the landscape.

The means of materialization that appeared with the first economic and cultural transformation—ceremonies, objects, and monuments—were not means whose production could be controlled. The warrior ideology was effective in centralizing political power only when it could be materialized in publicly displayed symbols (bronze weapons and personal jewelry) manufactured by specialists attached to the chiefs. Chiefly swords accompanied political office, and personal jewelry identified high-status women. The construction of chiefly burial monuments also helped to institutionalize power relationships in lineages with inherited offices and to establish rights over pastoral lands.

The early farmers of Thy were low-density farmers and herders living in the original forests of the region. They belonged to the Funnel Beaker culture, whose key theme was the identity of the ancestral (collective) group, represented by communal burials in megalithic monuments and ceremonial grounds. Diagnostic polished axes found in these burials probably referred to agriculture and fertility. This society was probably equivalent to a big-man collectivity (Kristiansen 1984, Johnson and Earle 1987).

The early megalithic burial mounds were among the most impressive monuments of Thy. To build these monuments required finding large boulders, weighing upwards of 20 tons, dragging them to the construction site, and seemingly miraculously placing them upright as walls and roofing for a central burial chamber. The labor involved in the construction of a passage grave such as Lundhøj in Thy was considerable; estimates for England range upwards of 15,000 person-days (Startin 1982). The central chamber was constructed of boulders chinked by careful stonework, with a clay cap to make the room fully waterproof. The mounds contained many burials, with skeletons intermixed after their flesh had fallen away. The megalithic monuments were probably associated with rites of passage, constructed as homes for the dead that could be reopened for additional burials and cyclical rituals of corporate identity with the commingled bones of ancestors (Hodder 1990).

The causewayed enclosure, a second monumental form of the Early Neolithic, was also built at this time in Denmark, and one example has been excavated in

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Thy. Spaced fairly regularly across the landscape, these enclosures were positioned in prominent locations, and each is associated with several megalithic monuments (Madsen 1988). Chains of pits were excavated, and the earth was thrown up to build a bank that enclosed a sacred or political space up to 20 ha in area. Special deposits of animal bone and ceramics were placed in pits filled all at once. Human skeletal material, such as lines of skulls, documents the occurrence of public death ceremonies within the enclosures.

Symbolic objects from the Early Farmer period include elaborately decorated ceramics and beautifully polished axes. Large ceramic vessels placed in front of the entrances of the burial monuments were probably associated with death ceremonies (Tilley 1984). Pieces of amber necklaces were found in the megalithic monuments, but individual interments were mixed and therefore grave goods were not identified with individuals. These objects, made of the local amber, would have been used for personal decoration, but their mixing after death would seem to deemphasize individuality. Nothing is more characteristic of the Early Farmer period than the thin-butted polished axes made of special flint from the shaft mines of Thy. These are working axes, used originally to clear the region's forests. The axes are found both singly and as hoards deposited in sacred wet places (bogs, streams, and springs). The symbolic association of the axes with agricultural clearing and water suggests that the axes were significant in fertility rituals.

The pastoral warriors of Thy were low-density herders practicing cereal-grain farming. According to the paleopollen record, the original forests of Thy had been cleared by this time and the grasslands established. The warriors belonged to the Neolithic Single Grave and Dagger Period cultures, and the key theme was individual identity, materialized by low burial mounds that marked the graves of individual men and women. Long-distance exchange linked the herders with northern Jutland and the western Bell Beaker settlement area (Jensen 1982, Vandkilde 1991).

The single-grave mounds were quite small, about 1 m high and perhaps 6 m in radius. A mound covered one (sometimes two) central interments laid out in a plank coffin. The labor invested in such monuments was modest, only a fraction of that for the megalithic mounds. A sequence of burials might be added, one on top of another with new mounding, or several mounds might be arranged in a line. Both patterns suggest family lines. The contrast between the materialized corporate identity of the Early Farmer period and the personal kinline of the Pastoral Warrior period probably represents a shift from clan to lineage organization. From the Single Grave culture onward, placing the dead in the soil of Thy must have created a cultural landscape associated with ("owned" by) specific kin lines, an important basis for chiefly organization.

The use of Bell Beaker ceramics also suggests the importance of ceremonial events. These ceramics were of special forms stylistically elaborated with detailed geometric incised lines filled with brilliant pigments. A likely use of these vessels would have been for copious consumption of alcohol on ceremonial occasions. The Bell Beaker phenomenon may therefore indicate the development of linked ceremonial events in a peer-polity interaction sphere. Such events would have provided an arena for status rivalry and the establishment of regional leadership identities. Control over such ceremonial events would, however, have been tenuous at best, as is evident in the comparable Moka ceremonies of New Guinea (Strathern 1971). Such events would have offered little opportunity to enlarge relationships or to pass on achieved prestige (*contra* Friedman and Rowlands 1978).

Symbolic objects in the Single Grave and Bell Beaker contexts evidently emphasized individual status and military standing. Single Grave men's graves were typically marked by a stone battle ax (or sometimes only flint blades); women's graves included amber necklaces, occasionally with many hundreds of small beads (Bech and Olsen 1985). While female status may still have been marked by items of personal decoration, male objects identified them as warriors. Bell Beaker graves are rare for Thy, but elsewhere they contain beautifully crafted flint daggers. Flint daggers and arrowheads were routinely recovered from all households, suggesting that these symbols of war were generally available. At the same time, amber was used much less commonly for personal display, a shift probably related to its export from Denmark to the European prestige-goods exchange systems (Shennan 1982).

Daggers, used for status display in the Late Neolithic, would have been difficult for chiefs to control. Manufactured in Thy from locally mined flint, they were carefully shaped with grinding and a finishing flaking. Their high level of craftsmanship would have restricted the numbers of knappers able to produce them, but lower-quality daggers were also made from field flints. Interestingly, the daggers were modeled after metal daggers from central Europe, suggesting a broad warrior ideology in which group leadership was associated with warrior might. But the actual objects, manufactured of locally available material, could not be monopolized. The overall impression is of a warrior society in which individual status was not highly differentiated. Symbolic objects continued to be manufactured of local materials, but the dominant symbolic reference of these objects changed to emphasize male warrior status, first with the battle axes and then with the daggers. However, because it was impossible to monopolize access to the wealth, ideological power remained diffuse.

The inhabitants of the Early Bronze Age chiefdoms of Thy were, again, low-density herders and agriculturalists living in an open grassland environment. They belonged to the Nordic Bronze Age culture. Male and female chiefs were buried under barrows, with fine weapons and wealth objects of bronze. Thy is famous for its Bronze Age barrows, the construction of which transformed the landscape. Hilltops were dotted with clusters of the burial mounds. Typically, a central individual was interred in a cist made of glacial boulders and a rounded mound was built up over it with turf and edged with a

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

curb of glacial boulders. Usually only one central burial was originally covered by the barrow, although others were often added later. Several of the monuments excavated in Thy showed major rebuilding, with a second construction phase that added a new outer curb and raised the monument's height. The sizes of the monuments varied. Some barrows, such as the distinctive mound of Bavnehøj in Sønderhå parish, Thy, were over 3 m high and 30 m in diameter. Clustered around the barrow were lesser mounds, most no more than 1 m high. Monuments that required significantly more labor than others may have contained paramount chiefs. The overall labor invested in individual mounds would not, however, have exceeded that of the earlier megalithic monuments. A fairly small group could have produced them without great effort.

These mounds divided the landscape into cultural regions probably owned by local chiefs. They materialized a social hierarchy and the religious sanctity by which it was legitimated. The landscape was transformed from open grassland to a world owned and controlled by chiefs whose right to leadership was rooted in their ancestry. The monuments alone were, however, ineffective as a means to consolidate power. Because their scale was modest, they could have been constructed by simpler social groups to represent a very different ideology. The construction of the monuments, though waxing and waning, seems more likely to represent a continuity in corporate labor practices. Why, then, was labor directed towards materializing individual ascendancy rather than group identity? Here the key seems to lie in the nature of the symbolic objects.

Although the reference of the symbolic objects (male:warfare::female:personal decoration) remained the same as for the preceding Warrior period, the technological character of the objects changed dramatically again. Objects of local manufacture all but ceased to define status. Ceramics from this period were simple, with only minimal decorative elaboration. No flint daggers or arrowheads were found. Amber, although found on all sites, was always raw, probably being collected for export. Symbolic objects were now almost exclusively of bronze, made from tin and copper, neither of which was available in Denmark. During the Early Bronze Age, male chiefly status was marked by beautifully crafted swords in the Nordic style, distinct from the working swords of associated warriors (fig. 1; Kristiansen 1984). More than 100 swords and daggers have been recovered from barrows in Thy, and their styles correspond to broader patterns of manufacture and decoration shared throughout Denmark and parts of Germany. While most swords were locally manufactured, chiefly swords required lost-wax molding, a sophisticated and difficult production process. The craftsmen able to produce such items would have been few and their activities could quite easily have been controlled by the chiefs (Kristiansen 1984, 1987, 1991).

Thus the key to chiefly status in Denmark during the Early Bronze Age may quite simply have been the changing technology of symbolic objects. With a shift to bronze the weapons and symbols of the warrior chiefs required a sophisticated manufacturing process, and as a consequence chiefs could control artisans as attached specialists (Brumfiel and Earle 1987). The absence of debris from the manufacture of swords demonstrates how spatially restricted their production must have been. Chiefs evidently solidified their dominance over both subsistence production and exchange through the direct supervision of sword production.



FIG. 1. *Early Bronze Age Period 2 Type C sword (Sword 105), from chiefly burial in Tødsø, Thisted Amt, Denmark. Reprinted from Ottenjann (1969: table 15, no. 105) by permission of the publisher.*

Female status continued to be identified with fine jewelry that signaled personal distinctiveness and attractiveness. Decorative bronze brooches were frequently found in the Thy barrows. In contrast to the swords, these items were manufactured primarily by annealing of traded wire or bars. Annealing, as opposed to casting, is technically quite simple. Brooch fragments from the residence at Thy 2999 may well indicate the local fabrication of jewelry here without chiefly supervision. Control over the materialization of the ideology of

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

rank would have been possible primarily for the male chiefs identified with the technologically more complex swords. Simpler bronze working, like the earlier flint and amber manufacture, would have been impossible to control.

The use of symbolic objects in Denmark changed dramatically during the time period under consideration. Group identity was deemphasized, and male status came to be associated with weapons of destruction. Initially these items, especially the flint daggers, were copies of southern metal daggers produced locally from available flint, but the manufacturing process did not permit effective control over these symbols. It was the introduction of bronze working that offered the opportunity for economic control necessary to permit the greater political centralization seen in the Early Bronze Age. Chiefs probably controlled long-distance procurement of metal through elite exchange and alliances, and the manufacture of this wealth could be controlled by patronage. The chiefs could thus retain exclusive access to weapons, symbols of military might, and an ideology of warrior domination.

SUMMARY

From Funnel Beaker (community and agricultural productivity) to Single Grave (the individual and his status in war or her personal adornment), cultural symbols changed profoundly. The forms of materialization, in earthen monuments, ceremonies, and symbolic objects, continued little changed. Single Grave barrows were sometimes placed on top of or immediately adjacent to earlier megalithic monuments, and amber objects and decorated ceramics continued to be found in the burials. Although this cultural change introduced a new ideology that would come to be associated with warrior chiefdoms, the chiefdoms did not arise until the male chiefly hierarchy was symbolized by metal weapons of war. The message of the ideology was important, but the opportunity to materialize that message through bronze technology was essential for the institutionalization of a highly ranked society in the Early Bronze Age.

From Chiefdom to State-Level Society: Moche

The Moche provide dramatic examples of the effects of materialized ideology in an emerging state-level society. While they have been the subject of numerous recent studies, the data presented here are based primarily on the results of the San José de Moro Archaeological Project, codirected by Christopher B. Donnan and Luis Jaime Castillo. Around A.D. 100, in the fertile coastal valleys of the northern Peruvian desert, Moche society evolved from the fairly simple Virú and Salinar chiefdoms to become, by about A.D. 450, one of the first state-level societies in the Andes. Moche society was clearly stratified into distinct social segments, expressed in differential burial practices (Castillo and Donnan 1994, Donnan 1991) and settlement patterns. Moche settlements vary in both size and function (Willey 1953, D. Wilson 1988), and within them we can identify socially differentiated areas or neighborhoods (Bawden 1977, 1982). The Moche economy was characterized by the diversification of production, craft specialization, long-distance exchange, and the construction of a large-scale irrigation infrastructure.

Traditionally the Moche have been considered a single polity (Larco 1945) on the basis of apparent similarities in art styles and ceramic forms. Recent evidence indicates, however, that the Moche comprised at least two independent polities (Donnan 1990), one centered in the southern Moche and Chicama Valleys and the other occupying centers in the Jequetepeque and Lambayeque Valley systems (Castillo and Donnan 1994). These distinct polities exhibit remarkably different developmental sequences. The northern Moche remained regionally independent states, never expanding beyond their traditional limits. In contrast, by about A.D. 400 the southern Moche had become an expansive territorial state that controlled the valleys to the south of it. However, in spite of these organizational differences, similarities in material culture indicate that the northern and southern Moche shared a culture evident in funerary practices, ceremonies, myths (depicted in murals and painted ceramics), and ritual paraphernalia.

Throughout their history, ideology was apparently a significant source of power for Moche elites. Their strategy included a complex system of ceremonies performed by Moche elite individuals and the investment of social wealth in the production of symbolic objects. The goal of the ceremonies was to increase social solidarity, involving all levels of society in the state's ritual endeavors. These shared ceremonies created a common ground of symbolic communication within the ranks of the elites and between elites and the lower-ranking levels of society. In Moche ceremony, each social segment was ascribed a role that reflected its position in the Moche pantheon of deities and supernatural beings. Only high-status elites could perform the leading roles, which legitimated their privileged position in society. Moche performances re-created myths and traditions and materialized narratives that represented the past. Through materialization, Moche elites appropriated and owned history and tradition.

The aim of their materialization of ideology through symbolic objects was to increase interdependencies and communication among elites, counteracting tendencies toward fragmentation among elites disconnected from the core of Moche society. To do this, Moche's high elite tightly controlled the production of symbolic objects, access to those objects, and their social uses, carefully monitoring their distribution throughout the lower levels of their own ranks. This strategy took two forms: vertical communication among elite social strata through redistribution of ritual objects and horizontal communication among the highest-status elites through exchange of the most elaborate symbolic and exotic objects. Eventually, these activities generated a pan-Moche elite ideology (Castillo 1994).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CEREMONIAL EVENTS

Moche society shows evidence of complex social stratification in its earliest stages. Burial ceremonies were particularly important in reflecting social structure and its supporting ideology. The burials vary dramatically in form, in the labor costs of preparing the tomb and the body, and especially in the number and type of symbolic goods accompanying the deceased. An astonishing picture emerges from the study of more than 300 Moche burials that have been excavated archaeologically (Donnan 1991).

Differences in funerary treatment between social segments are usually qualitative; each status group had access to specific types and qualities of symbolic objects. High-status burials frequently contain gold and silver objects, fine ceramics, imported materials such as *Spondylus* shells, and precious stones such as lapis lazuli and turquoise (Alva and Donnan 1993, Donnan and Castillo 1992). Middle-status burials contain fewer metal and ceramic objects, usually of lesser quality (Donnan and Mackey 1978). Low-status burials generally lack grave goods (Donnan 1991).

Beyond these qualitative differences, quantitative variation also characterizes burials of individuals belonging to the same social segment. Individuals may receive more or less of the same class of object in burials, and this pattern is visible in other aspects of social life as well. Household size, arrangement, and quality of construction materials all appear to be clearly stratified along the same lines as burials. Furthermore, studies of settlement organization demonstrate that social status also implied differential access to ceremonial spaces (Bawden 1977, 1982; Haas 1985).

Preferential access to, and manipulation of, the ceremonial system was clearly an important source of power for Moche elites. Until recently, however, we were unsure whether these relationships were limited to funerary representations of ceremonies and myth. The only available clue was contained in the vivid depictions of Moche iconography, which illustrate ritual deer hunts, dances, and combat. Participants in these scenes appear to be Moche elites; lower-status individuals appear only as service providers (Donnan 1978). Archaeological evidence confirms that the depicted ritual events actually took place (Castillo 1991, Donnan and Castillo 1992, Donnan and Mackey 1978).

Moche ceremonies differed in their importance and impact, depending upon the roles and participants and the message that each involved. The most complex Moche rituals involved deities and supernatural beings in central roles (Castillo 1989). The Sacrifice Ceremony (fig. 2) was evidently the most dramatic ritual in the Moche liturgy (Alva and Donnan 1993, Donnan 1975). In this ceremony, defeated warriors were sacrificed by anthropomorphized animals and animated objects that cut their throats, pouring the blood into tall ceremonial goblets (fig. 2, *bottom*). These goblets were then given to several mythical figures, usually figure B (a birdlike individual) and figure C (a female), to present to two of the paramount Moche deities, figures A and D, who promptly consumed the blood (fig. 2, *top*). Archaeological evidence indicates that this rite was practiced throughout 450 years of Moche history (Alva and Donnan 1993). This evidence has been recovered in every region under the control of the Moche, either in the form of iconographic representations or in ritual paraphernalia associated with elite burials (Alva and Donnan 1993; Bonavia 1959, 1985; Donnan and Castillo 1992, 1994; Strong and Evans 1952; Ubbelohde-Doering 1983). Thus, the Sacrifice Ceremony was a pan-Moche ceremonial event, crosscutting political boundaries.

Recent excavations have uncovered elite burials containing paraphernalia associated with the Sacrifice Ceremony. These objects include the goblet that contained the blood of the prisoners (Donnan and Castillo 1992: 40), figure A's scepter (Alva and Donnan 1993:97–101), and clothing elements associated with figures A, B, and

FIG. 2. *Moche fine-line representation of the Sacrifice Ceremony, from a Moche IV stirrup-spout bottle, Museo Arqueológico Rafael Larco Hoyle, Lima, Peru. (Drawing by S. Castillo.)*

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

C. These finds demonstrate that some elite individuals personified, probably throughout their lives and certainly at the time of their death, the deities and priests in this ceremony. The symbolic objects found in the graves played a key role in the performances of mythical events that were re-created by living members of the elite to materialize the Moche ideology. On the basis of the contents of elite tombs at Sipán, in the Lambayeque Valley, Alva and Donnan (1993) suggest that the Lord of Sipán fulfilled in life figure A's ceremonial roles. Also at Sipán, these researchers have recognized another deity featured in the same ceremony, figure B, who wears a large birdlike headpiece and is shown presenting the goblet to figure A (Alva and Donnan 1993:143–61). At the site of San José de Moro, in the Jequetepeque Valley, Donnan and Castillo (1992) have located two elaborate tombs of females that contain examples of the goblet used in the Sacrifice Ceremony (Castillo and Donnan 1994). These females were buried with the headdress of yet another deity depicted in the Sacrifice Ceremony, figure C, a female who presents to figures A and D the goblet full of human blood (Donnan and Castillo 1992: 41). Finding the goblet and the headdress together in two roughly contemporaneous tombs confirms that elite individuals personified Moche deities and that these roles passed from one individual to another.

To maintain their legitimacy, Moche elites had to control the material expressions of ideology that defined their positions in society. Individuals' social positions controlled their access to resources and specified their political and ceremonial roles. We have found this stratified access to ritual life and its symbols in the variable contents of burials. The highest-status burials contain the actual paraphernalia and ritual attire worn during rituals such as the Sacrifice Ceremony (Alva and Donnan 1993, Donnan and Castillo 1992). Among members of the immediately inferior social level, for example, lower-elite individuals in Pacatnamú (Ubbelohde-Doering 1983), we find carved gourds and ceramic vessels with detailed fine-line or three-dimensional representations of ceremonial events but not the actual paraphernalia. In the middle levels of society we find only representations of parts or elements of the ritual events; this is the case for some infant burials at San José de Moro (Donnan and Castillo n.d.). Finally, burials of members of the lowest levels of society contain almost no evidence for objects of symbolic or ceremonial value (Donnan 1991). This differential access to materialized ideology clearly characterized vertical relations in Moche society.

SYMBOLIC OBJECTS

The materialization of ideology created and maintained the social fabric of Moche society through deliberate strategic control of the production and distribution of ritual or symbolic objects among the ranks of the elites. Elite Moche funerary contexts show preferential access by elites to certain symbols and raw materials, especially fine ceramic vessels. These ceramics were frequently decorated with complex iconography, often narrative in character (Castillo 1991) and finely detailed, as in the representations of the Sacrifice Ceremony. Since only elite burials contain these objects, the vessels and the information coded on them were probably socially restricted. These objects not only marked the status of the individual in death but also were used to exercise power in society.

Moche symbolic objects were often the product of skilled labor, and some incorporated exotic raw materials such as pigments, clays, *Spondylus* shells, and sodalite and turquoise stones. A hypothetical scenario for the production and distribution of ceremonial ceramics can be postulated from studies of ceramic production centers (Russell, Leonard, and Briceño 1994). The distribution of identifiable ceramic styles suggests that fine ceramics were manufactured in every Moche region, probably with more than one production center within a region at every point in time. Ceramic production was based on the needs of target populations, taking into account the quality and quantity of vessels necessary to meet the demands of strategic political activity. Unfortunately, we have not yet discovered the centers of manufacture for fine ceramics, although a few middle-range ceramic production centers are now known. Areas producing simple domestic wares are widespread throughout the region (Russell, Leonard, and Briceño 1994). Logically, we can assume that high elites controlled fine ceramic production, keeping for themselves the more elaborate pieces and distributing others among members of the lower-ranking elite. Archaeological evidence suggests that the rulers of different regions and polities exchanged some of their finest ritual objects (Glenn Russell, personal communication, 1992).

Symbolic objects were, therefore, a means of communication between elites that integrated their ranks and strengthened their vertical hierarchy. As materialized ideology, they also reinforced horizontal linkages among rulers. Although the Moche peasantry was knowledgeable about the rituals enacted in ceremonial places and familiar with orally transmitted narratives and public renditions of iconography such as mural paintings, it had no access to the symbolic objects themselves.

At the northern Moche site of San José de Moro (Castillo 1994; Castillo and Donnan 1994; Donnan and Castillo 1992, 1994, n.d.), around A.D. 650 we see for the first time evidence of imported ritual objects, some of them from the central coast valleys of Lima and Lurín, as far as 700 km south. These goods, among the finest produced in their native societies, appear only in the most complex Moche burials and are absent from domestic contexts. This burial pattern implies that the highest Late Moche elite controlled long-distance exchange in order to monopolize these ritual objects from the then-flourishing central coast societies. Because Moche elites had traditionally relied upon materialized ideology as a source of power, this exchange appears to have been particularly significant for a society in decline such as the Late Moche.

The introduction of foreign symbolic objects must

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

have severely impacted social relationships among Moche elites. According to our model, the higher elites were obliged to redistribute a portion of the ritual objects they controlled among the lower ranks to maintain reciprocity and generate dependency. However, in importing foreign ceramic objects, Moche higher elites no longer controlled the entire production process. The scarcity of foreign ceramics suggests that they were in short supply. One response was to copy the foreign objects. Some of the copies incorporated Moche elements, while others employed only the foreign forms and design elements. These copies were distributed among the middle and lower ranks of the elite, decreasing in both quantity and quality as they descended the social ladder. This pattern mirrors the distribution pattern of Moche ceramics with complex iconography.

The absence of foreign ceramics throughout earlier Moche history suggests a deliberate effort to prevent these exotic symbols from entering Moche territory and influencing its populace. Political or ideological association with foreign elites appears to have been of little use to the Moche, especially when they were expanding and vigorous states. What, then, caused Moche leaders not only to import foreign symbolic objects but also to copy them? Perhaps these fine objects, as material wealth, were more prestigious than the local versions, and in copying them the Late Moche acknowledged their intrinsic quality or technical superiority. In this scenario, owning foreign precious objects would have become a matter of prestige and conspicuous consumption for Moche elites (Trigger 1990). Under closer scrutiny, this explanation implies that finely crafted objects are automatically more valuable than simpler goods, regardless of their origin and meaning. From the perspective of materialization, this view is incomplete, because it denies the symbolic value of the objects, considering only their exchange value. In terms of materialization, the importing and reproduction not only of the symbolic objects but also of the ideology they signified suggests that Moche elites valued these foreign objects in part because of their symbolic meaning. This meaning might have been reinterpreted to fit Moche canons and used by elites to bolster their social positions. Apparently, they did not succeed, for less than one generation after the new objects appeared the Moche were gone for good.

MONUMENTAL ARCHITECTURE

The territory controlled by the southern Moche is dotted with some of the most impressive ceremonial pyramids in the New World, such as the Huacas del Sol and de la Luna in the Moche Valley, constructed with more than 100 million adobe bricks (Hastings and Moseley 1975), Huancaco, in the Virú Valley (Willey 1953), and Pañamarca, in the Nepeña Valley (Proulx 1973). In contrast, in the northern Moche territory, ceremonial centers such as Pacatnamú and San José de Moro in the Jequetepeque Valley are smaller and less impressive.[3] These differences in monument construction apparently relate to the expansive nature of the southern Moche state. The southern Moche ultimately controlled populations with clearly diverse ethnic backgrounds but succeeded, surprisingly rapidly, in integrating these populations into the Moche mode of production and geopolitical strategy. This rapid integration has been explained either by reference to the militaristic character of Moche society (D. Wilson 1988) or by assuming a common cultural substratum for all northern coast societies that facilitated the enculturation process. While both factors probably contributed to Moche expansion, they cannot wholly account for long-term cultural transformations.

We believe that the strategy of the southern Moche was based at least in part on an ideological infiltration, planned and executed in advance of true geopolitical control, with ceremonial centers of monumental proportions serving as beachheads for this advance. For example, the southernmost valley under Moche influence, the Nepeña Valley, was never completely under Moche control. Surveying this valley, Proulx (1973) found a Moche ceremonial center of monumental proportions surrounded by residential areas that were clearly inhabited by non-Moche groups. Why do we find a Moche ceremonial center in a territory that is otherwise obviously non-Moche? Rather than serving the needs of a devoted Moche community, this center targeted a local population. This investment in monument construction, whether by Moche or by local labor, implies that the state was interested in first occupying the minds of the inhabitants to ease the later occupation of their fields.

Among the northern Moche, the materialization of ideology was through ceremonial events and the controlled circulation of symbolic objects rather than monument construction. These events and objects helped to legitimate the highly stratified social structure. Since the northern Moche were apparently less interested in enculturating foreign populations, their goal seems instead to have been to perpetuate the existing social system and its elite institutions. As a result, monumental architecture, less essential to these objectives, was not broadly undertaken as a part of a northern Moche materialization strategy.

SUMMARY

Throughout both the northern and southern Moche states, a pan-Moche iconography sustained a highly stratified social system. Political roles in Moche society were defined and acted out in dramatic ceremonies in which elaborate ritual attire and vivid symbolic images expressed narrative conceptions of Moche elite power and

3. Only one comparable structure can be found in the northern Moche territory, the late Moche pyramid of Huaca Grande, in the Pampa Grande complex of the Lambayeque Valley (Haas 1985). Debate continues as to whether this structure represents the expansion of the southern Moche and the consequent relocation of the capital in this northerly site (Moseley 1992, Castillo and Donnan 1994). In any case, Huaca Grande is an extremely late phenomenon, constructed with a peculiar technique not seen in the massive pyramids built in this region during the Lambayeque period, and it is therefore not comparable to any previous structure in the northern Moche territory.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

authority. Fine-line drawings materialized scenes of these rituals, and the burials of high elites mirrored their privileged roles in life. The iconographic system institutionalized the stratified character of Moche society; its rich elaboration seemed to heighten the separation between the high elite and Moche peasants.

While the northern and southern Moche polities shared an iconography and social structure, the role of monument construction in the two regions differed markedly. From the perspective of materialization, we may explain this in terms of contrasting political objectives, viewing the monument construction activities of the southern Moche, among the most ambitious of those of Peru's early states, as an integral part of the state's expansion. As a whole, the Moche case illustrates the strategic role of an ideology of elite culture and its effectiveness, through materialization, as a source of power.

An Expansionist Empire: Inka

Because of their scale, expanding states and empires face problems of communication and the challenge of establishing authority over conquered groups, which may not share a language or culture with their rulers. Because ceremony and monument construction provide direct means of communication that do not depend entirely on shared language or customs, these forms of materialization may be particularly emphasized in expansion and conquest. Archaeological evidence suggests that these and other forms of materialized ideology played a central role in the Inka expansion.

During the 15th century A.D., the Inkas established dominion over a vast territory reaching from Ecuador to Argentina. Beginning as a complex chiefdom centered in Cuzco, Peru, a single ethnic group of probably no more than 100,000, the Inkas built a conquest empire that eventually stretched approximately 4,000 km from north to south. The Inka empire incorporated diverse environments and perhaps 12 million subjects representing more than 100 separate ethnicities. Conquered groups ranged from great coastal states such as the Chimú to small-scale tribal societies on the eastern jungle fringe. Recent studies recognize that Inka strategies varied in response to local economies and political structure, the resistance of local groups, and the objectives of particular emperors (Bauer 1992, D'Altroy 1992, LeVine 1985). Generally, however, the Inkas conquered core regions by direct occupation and assimilation. In distant or marginal areas they ruled more indirectly, through client elites. As part of this process, the Inkas materialized a complex state ideology that, balanced by elements of coercion, promoted a unified Inka culture (Rowe 1982).

The strategic character of Inka materialization demonstrates that ideology, rather than simply reflecting social structure, is used to create it. Inka expansion initially depended on military might, and the continuing threat of force underlay the state's domination (D'Altroy 1992). However, a long-term goal was to solidify and to institutionalize imperial control by exporting a state ideology. At the regional level, feasts structured relations between the state and its subject laborers in terms of traditional Andean reciprocity. For the Inkas, ideology was a crucial means to maintain the state's rights to the taxes (generally, but not entirely, labor service) that financed state activities. This objective is also visible in the state's efforts to create insignia and emblems to identify local elite intermediaries as Inka officials; these subordinates performed essential duties in their local communities, organizing corvée crews and administering other activities on behalf of the state.

CEREMONIAL EVENTS

Inka feasts were the most direct element of the relationship between the state and most of its subjects. Inka ritual hospitality materialized the power and wealth of the state on a grand scale. After conquering new territory, the state alienated all agricultural lands militarily and symbolically and reallocated them to the ayllu (a kin-based corporate group) as a demonstration of "Inca omniscient benevolence in action" (Murra 1980[1956]: 94). In granting land rights back to the community, the Inkas legitimated their rights to labor service. In reality, however, the state did not interfere with traditional land tenure practices, and the subsistence and welfare of its members remained the responsibility of the ayllu. Subject groups tilled agricultural lands set aside for state use and worked newly defined state lands (Murra 1980[1956]). Corvée crews formed the military, constructed facilities, temples, and storehouses, and built roads to tie Inka centers together. The state, in return for these services, hosted work parties in traditional Andean fashion, providing workers with food and chicha (maize beer) (Murra 1980[1956]). Excavations at Huánuco Pampa suggest that state hospitality took place on a massive scale (Morris and Thompson 1985). This Inka center was located far from agricultural lands and local centers of population, yet its many storehouses contained abundant foodstuffs. Central to Huánuco Pampa was a 19-ha plaza, a setting for the feasts described by early Spanish chroniclers. In the plaza's excavated assemblage, the dominant ceramic vessel form was the *aríbalo,* a large, high-necked Inka liquid-storage vessel probably used to serve chicha in public ceremonies.

Inka feasts thus expressed the state's authority, at the same time embedding it in long-established relationships between a community and its leader (Morris 1985). Maize was a prestige crop in Andean society before the conquest; local chiefs carried heavy jars of chicha with them as they traveled to meet their political obligations (Rostworowski 1977). In excavations of pre-Inka period settlements in the Mantaro Valley, Perú, maize and large liquid-storage vessels were found primarily in elite domestic areas, suggesting local chiefly hospitality (Earle et al. 1987, Costin 1986). After the conquest, however, the Inkas appear to have taken over the role of host in this strategic region; local elite-sponsored feasts declined in frequency (Costin and Earle 1989). Further, as the Inkas expanded their ritual role, overall maize consumption greatly increased. Studies of the stable iso-

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

tope ratios of skeletal material from the Mantaro Valley indicate that males consumed more maize after the conquest, probably in the form of chicha served at state-sponsored ceremonies (Hastorf 1990).

In hosting feasts, the Inkas ensured that rights to community labor, formerly a political and economic prerogative of local elites, would instead legitimately belong to the state (Murra 1960). In effect, the state was "earning" its authority (Morris 1982) directly from the populace. Because, as a tributary state, the Inka empire did not directly control subsistence production and because it depended upon an extensive bureaucracy, the materialization of ideology appears to have played a key role as a source of power. Inka feasts reinforced the ties of reciprocity that linked the empire's distant, largely self-sufficient subject communities to the center of power, Cuzco, and to the institutions of Inka religion.

At the same time, this was an ideology of coercion, mystifying power relationships and legitimating the emperor. This hierarchical character is best illustrated by the rites and festivals held at the royal court in Cuzco to observe religious occasions and to celebrate military triumphs. Participants included successful military leaders and provincial elites, among others, who consumed elaborate food and chicha and often received gifts of fine metal, elaborate textiles, or precious stones. Chroniclers describe events that included ritual sacrifices of humans, llamas and other animals, and sumptuary goods (Guaman Poma de Ayala 1987[1614], vol. 1: 252–64). At the same time, coercion and military action were integral elements of this materialized ideology. For example, as punishment, two Qolla lords who had led an uprising were flayed, and drums made of their hides were played in the celebrations in Cuzco that followed their defeat (Cobo 1892[1653], vol. 3, bk. 12, chap. 14:169).

Royal festivals perpetuated the sacred role of Inka rulers. Essentially, ritual events were also political events that elevated the emperor's position, equating him with the god of the sun, Inti. Ancestor worship was a central theme in Inka religion; the ruling family was said to have descended directly from this deity. Religion and myth augmented the political authority of the emperor, giving him supernatural identity (Rowe 1946, Conrad and Demarest 1984). The mummified bodies of dead emperors, cared for by their descendants, continued to attend feasts, receive offerings, and observe Inka ritual (Cieza de León 1985[1553], vol. 2, chap. 11:27–29 and chap. 30:90–93).

The close interdependence of politics and religion was apparent to Bernabé Cobo, a Spanish chronicler: "The truth is that Inca religion did not remain fixed and unchanging from the birth of the realm onward; they did not cling to the same few beliefs or worship the same few gods. . . . They were induced to make changes in [religious] matters because they began to realize that in this way they could strengthen themselves and keep the kingdom under tighter control" (Cobo 1892[1653], vol. 3, bk. 13, chap. 1:302, translated in Conrad and Demarest 1984:109). Inka ritual events were therefore political activities, and thus they targeted specific participants. Materialized ideology was meant to create shared experience and to perpetuate the unquestioned power of the state, especially among unruly and rebellious groups. In the provinces, large feasts emphasized the state's generosity for peasant laborers to legitimate labor obligations. When the Inka traveled to the provinces, he went forth on a golden litter surrounded by emblems of the sun and moon and other sacred symbols of the royal lineage (Cieza de León 1985[1553], vol. 2, chap. 20:56–59). Festivals in Cuzco were aimed at provincial elites (and others), who visited the capital regularly, presumably to experience firsthand the wealth and privilege of the emperor. To integrate provincial elites more readily, Inka policy required their sons to spend time in Cuzco to learn the Inka language and to become familiar with Inka customs and culture (Cieza de León 1985 [1553], vol. 2, chap. 14:37–39).

SYMBOLIC OBJECTS

Inka ideology fostered associations of Inka symbolic objects and state insignia with the emperor. Through materialization, the ritual and political meanings of symbolic objects were closely linked. State insignia, including finely woven cloth and metal objects, were given as gifts to strengthen alliances, to fund and legitimate new institutions of control, and to reward supporters. As in the realm of feasting, the Inkas drew on existing elements of Andean material culture and technology, elaborating their meanings to create symbols of imperial power and wealth. The rich cultural significance of cloth (Murra 1962) and the technological virtuosity expressed in metallurgy enhanced their value (Lechtman 1984), as did their exclusive association with the emperor.

The Inkas also recognized the symbolic importance of local cult objects. After conquering a province, the Inkas removed its most sacred religious symbol or icon to Cuzco, where it was effectively held hostage to minimize the chance of rebellion (Cobo 1892[1653], vol. 3, bk. 12, chap. 22:221). Other local cult objects were brought to Cuzco for year-long visits, presumably to enhance their value through association with the Inka court (Rowe 1982). These coercive and highly symbolic acts expressed a hierarchical message which targeted local religious loyalties as a source of meaning that could be co-opted and manipulated by the state to increase security.

At another level, materialization through objects was the primary means by which the Inkas negotiated relationships with local political leaders, whose authority now depended largely on their affiliation with the state. D'Altroy and Earle (1985) have argued that wealth finance supported this element of Inka strategy, describing the process through which the Inkas mobilized valuables for efficient transport, storage, and use as payment. While many of these wealth goods had intrinsic value deriving from their scarcity (such as metals) or high labor input (such as textiles), they were imbued with addi-

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

tional value derived from the meaning they expressed in their exclusive association with the emperor. In a sense, through materialization the state increased the efficacy of its wealth production by closely (and exclusively) associating Inka ideology with these manufactured objects. For example, the *aqllakuna,* or "chosen women," wove fine cloth and brewed chicha exclusively for the state; their activities linked the spheres of religious activity and economic production to enhance the meaning (and hence the value) of the finished goods. The Inka nobility also monopolized gold and silver, and goods containing these scarce metals were valued more highly for the same reasons.

Evidence from diverse areas of the empire suggests that materialization through symbols and insignia affected the economic policies of the Inkas, leading them to reorganize craft production and to intensify efforts to obtain exotic raw materials. The emperor Thupa 'Inka Yupanki resettled specialist producers of ceramics near Cajamarca (Espinoza Soriano 1970), and other enclaves of craft production were established near Cuzco to increase output (Morris and Murra 1976). As the conquests continued, the ranks of craft specialists and retainers expanded to include attendants and servants (*aqlla, yana,* and *mitmaq*) who were no longer simply corvée laborers but full-time attached specialists (Murra 1980[1956]) converting raw materials into materialized ideology.

The Inka reorganization of craft production reached far beyond Cuzco to the Calchaquí Valley in Argentina, about 1,500 km south of the Inka capital. In recent research there we have examined the nature of the Inka conquest and occupation of this region, known for its bronze artisans (the Santamariana culture) and rich ore deposits (D'Altroy et al. n.d.; Gonzalez 1979; Pollard 1981, 1983). Under Inka rule, metal production in the Calchaquí Valley was reorganized, presumably to produce finished metal goods for export to Cuzco. At Valdéz, a Santamariana residential center, excavations have uncovered ceramic molds used for making copper ingots (Hagstrum 1992). In contrast, evidence for the *manufacture* of metal objects and ornaments made of mica, marine shell, and malachite was concentrated at the Inka center of Potrero de Payogasta. These data suggest that while the initial stages of metal production took place at Valdéz, the production of finished goods was closely supervised by Inka officials in an Inka facility. From the rarity of the finished objects at Potrero we infer that they were exported by the state (D'Altroy et al. n.d., Earle 1994). Potrero is ideally situated for transit, located along the Inka road at the northern entrance to the valley (DeMarrais 1993, Hyslop 1984).

The need for the exotic and scarce materials used in the materialization of their ideology also led the Inkas to seek sources of raw materials through exchange with groups on the central and north coasts of Peru and Ecuador. Historical documents (Rostworowski 1970) and archaeological work (Morris 1988) suggest that because Chincha traders could supply *Spondylus* shell and metals the state rewarded them with gifts and built a center in the Chincha Valley, linked to Cuzco by an elaborate road. Further north, near Quito, Inka officials promoted the status of local lords who traded with tropical-forest regions beyond the empire's frontier (Salomon 1987). Through these activities, the Inkas promoted the state's economic interests in these exchange relationships, many of which it could not directly control but which were vital to the materialization of its ideology.

STATE FACILITIES AND THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The Inkas materialized their presence throughout the empire through a landscape and architecture of power. Inka roads, settlements, and fortresses were the essential infrastructure for conquest and occupation in many parts of the empire (Gasparini and Margolies 1980, Hyslop 1990). At the same time, however, these elements of the landscape had enormous value as symbols. The roads especially symbolized the logistical strength and organizational power of the empire (Hyslop 1984). Corvée crews constructed over 23,000 km of roads with suspension bridges, causeways, and stairways across the steep Andean terrain. The roads linked the facilities of the empire together to form a coherent network of primary and secondary routes.

The roads and facilities represent an impressive and efficient organization. The Inkas preferred diplomacy to military engagement and combat, relying as much on the threat of force as on its implementation (D'Altroy 1992). Roads were a key means to materialize that threat. Capital investments in roads and facilities were costly, drawing energy and personnel away from subsistence production and substantially increasing the costs of occupation. At the same time, if a road through a region meant that military forces were readily mobilized in the event of an uprising, the chances of rebellion might be lessened. As visible reminders of Inka force, roads (as well as fortresses) enhanced the threat of military action at the same time that they served as basic elements of infrastructure.

The Inkas called their empire Tawantinsuyu, "land of the four provinces," reflecting their view of its organization. Cuzco, the capital, was considered the navel (Garcilaso de la Vega 1943[1609], pt. 1, bk. 2, chap. 11:89–90). In its layout and organization it was a physical representation or microcosm of the empire (Hyslop 1990:64). The *zeque* system, mentioned above, acted as a physical map of conceptual relationships, systematizing complex information about political organization, ceremonial sites, astronomy and sight lines, and features of the landscape (Zuidema 1964, 1982, 1983). Evidence even suggests that, in resettling groups near Cuzco, the Inkas arranged them so that Cuzco and its environs replicated in miniature the spatial distribution of groups in the empire as a whole (Espinoza Soriano 1987:320). Because the Inkas regularly moved laborers, troops, and sometimes even whole ethnic groups great distances, material representations of space apparently played a key role in conceptualizing the physical geography of the empire.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Around Cuzco, the Inkas constructed walls and structures of cut-stone masonry of monumental proportions. Away from Cuzco, however, Inka corvée crews built relatively few *monuments* on a scale comparable to that of the enormous huacas of the southern Moche. Instead, *facilities*—spaces and buildings designed to be used—for feasts, for administration, for housing troops and laborers, and for storage made up most of the constructed landscape of the provinces. Some were temples; others materialized power. Inka rectangular layouts and building forms imparted a recognizable structure to sites in the hinterland (Gasparini and Margolies 1980, Hyslop 1990). Major state settlements were dominated by a large, often trapezoidal plaza in which stood a ceremonial platform. Because the emperor stood upon this platform to address his subjects, it was a symbol, acting even in his frequent absences as a physical reminder of his central role in the proceedings. Usually adjacent to the plaza were a large rectangular structure, the *kallanka* and residential compounds or *kancha*. The uniform design of many state centers probably carried over to the practices associated with Inka feasts so that these elements contributed to a common experience of Inka ritual throughout the empire.

As far south as the Calchaquí Valley, the layouts and architecture of state installations clearly mark them as Inka sites. Potrero de Payogasta (fig. 3), located on the Inka road about 20 km north of a cluster of Santamariana settlements, has a large, well-defined plaza with a central platform and associated *kallanka* and compounds. The elaboration of this sector suggests that Potrero was a setting for state-sponsored feasts (DeMarrais 1993). In the Calchaquí Valley, as in more central regions (Morris 1982), the Inkas appear to have separated local administrative facilities from state centers of hospitality, perhaps to emphasize the ritual character of feasts and the vertical hierarchy separating state from local authority. The site of Potrero de Payogasta, located in this distant region, has readily recognizable Inka design features.



FIG. 3. *Potrero de Payogasta, an Inka residential and ceremonial center located in the northern Calchaquí Valley, Salta Province, Argentina. The plaza complex occupies the northwest sector of the site.* Solid lines, *masonry walls;* dotted lines, *walls not well preserved on the surface. Contour lines represent 2-m intervals.*

SUMMARY

The Inka case illustrates the role of materialization in an expanding state, where ideology must be broadly communicated among an ethnically and linguistically diverse populace. In its manipulation of Andean tradition, Inka ideology could be understood at the community level and also, throughout the hierarchy, encouraged the cooperation of state personnel. More generally, in a territorially extensive polity financed by taxation, an elaborated ideology becomes a significant source of power, encouraging and enforcing compliance. Through materialization, the Inkas responded to local conditions, emphasizing a message of coercion in regions where resistance was strong, or regions which contained vital resources or were strategically located. Here and elsewhere, coercion was balanced by reciprocity, as the state attempted to facilitate integration and to ease the imposition of the corvée. In its early stages, Inka expansion depended heavily upon military force, which necessitated costly investments in security, administration, and infrastructure (D'Altroy 1992, Luttwak 1976). Eventually, however, the Inkas secured a labor base in these regions to finance materialization and other projects. As the empire incorporated more distant provinces, feasting probably remained important, while reliance on client elites would have grown, increasing demand for state insignia and leading the state to intensify craft production to meet these obligations.

For the Inkas, the materialization of ideology clearly meant massive costs on an ongoing basis. It seems reasonable to argue, however, that materialized ideology, exploited by the Inkas as a significant source of power, provided an overarching structure to state-subject relations that could be, and was, adapted to local conditions and changing imperial priorities. Because the state did not directly control productive lands in most areas, the vivid imagery and the reciprocal message of Inka ideology could, in their materialization, complement and balance the exercise of military power. Both sources of power contributed to achieving the goals of integration, finance, and legitimation.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Conclusions

On the surface the three cases chosen for analysis seem diverse, the result of adaptations to strikingly different environments and varying in political scale and complexity, but we see that social power in each case depended upon the strategic allocation of resources to consolidate leadership and to support new institutions of control. In each case, the sources of power were various, and hierarchical control emerged as a result of interdependent decisions. Each of these societies was characterized by competition, resistance, and a tendency to fragment into smaller political units. We argue that the materialization of ideology was one mechanism for stabilizing power relations to help counteract this fragmentation.

The ideologies of ruling segments are by nature ambivalent and contradictory, promoting a sense of community and common identity while they justify social differences and unequal access to wealth and authority. The materialization of ideology invests social capital, usually labor, to achieve specific objectives that often are contained in the messages of the ideology. For example, materialization can help to create solidarity, social cohesion, or group identity, while legitimating leadership and demonstrating the basic coercive nature of its authority. The different *means* of materialization accomplish varying political objectives, including unifying or assembling groups (events), rewarding loyal followers (symbolic objects), perpetuating images of corporate power or chiefly control (monuments), and spreading a message or propaganda (texts). The resources allocated to materialization are being diverted from other economic activities essential to the welfare of a polity, including subsistence production, so that the choice of materialization activities is also influenced by economic conditions and the nature of the challenges faced by the ruling segment.

In the Danish case, the effectiveness of ideology was tied to its message, as, over time, symbols of prowess in warfare became markers of successful chiefs. However, from the perspective of materialization, we see that chiefs could not exert exclusive control over the ideology until they controlled the technology of metal production and the exchanges through which metal swords and daggers were obtained. Thus, while the message of ideology is important, it is crucial to understand the linkages between ideology and other systems of control (over labor, raw materials, exchange) to see how materialization permits a chief to consolidate and institutionalize power.

A complex system of iconography sustained the Moche ruling elite. As in the Danish case, elite burials expressed individual status. Moche elites fulfilled ceremonial roles in life, had access to the finest ceramics, and were honored after death with rich burials that perpetuated their images. The elaborate ceremonial artifacts recovered from the burials of the Moche's "living gods" strictly limited ritual performances to those who controlled the requisite metal and textile elements of the ceremonial attire. Iconography, as materialized ideology, strengthened horizontal ties between elites, creating a pan-Moche culture, at the same time as it reinforced vertical relations by carefully assigning roles to participants in Moche ritual.

The Inka case illustrates the use of diverse materialization strategies to secure a remarkably heterogeneous population under imperial rule. Inka feasts created cohesion and integration, reinforcing messages about reciprocal obligations between the state and its subjects even though these tributary relations were in fact coercive and largely asymmetrical. At the same time, in Cuzco, festivals and ritual events materialized the wealth and power surrounding the emperor effusively, making a challenge to Inka authority seem a daunting prospect. Close control of attached specialists meant that state symbols had value both as scarce objects and as signifiers of exclusive association with the divine world of the emperor. The Inka infrastructure served multiple symbolic and functional roles to materialize the Inka's activities in all their provinces.

Materialization depends upon a society's economic base, but as an active element in the process of building and consolidating political power it can also be a cause of significant change. By exercising control over bronze swords, Danish chiefs were able to centralize and consolidate their power for the first time, but in doing this they became dependent upon exchange networks for continuing access to bronze. Moche elites successfully materialized a ritual world of privilege; once established, the institutions of ceremony became the primary basis of legitimacy and authority in Moche society. The Inka empire incurred huge costs to sponsor ritual feasts to legitimate demands for subjects' labor service. Moreover, ongoing Inka efforts to centralize and intensify craft production and to control external exchange relationships suggest that the institutions of Inka ideology, while central to administration of the vast empire, entailed continuing maintenance expenditures.

Because multiple ideas and beliefs exist in a given society, a ruling segment must control the ideology—shared ideas, beliefs, and their representations—that legitimates its position and authority. Giving an ideology concrete, physical form in events, symbolic objects, monuments, and writing systems is instrumental to its institutionalization and extension. The costs of materializing ideology restrict access to this source of power, with the result that through control of key resources a ruling segment may be able to restrict the contexts of use and the transmission of ideas and symbols. The specific means and forms of materialization chosen by elites depend upon their goals and resources. These choices in turn affect the success of the ideology in achieving integration, overcoming opposition, or consolidating political power. Materialization is a means through which symbols, their meanings, and beliefs can be manipulated to become an important source of social power.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Thu, 22 Dec 2016 16:18:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms